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ABSTRACT 
Utilizing intentionally vulnerable web applications to teach and practice cyber 
security principles and techniques provides a unique hands-on experience that is 
otherwise unobtainable without working in the real world.  Creating such applications 
that emulate those of actual businesses and organizations without exposing actual 
businesses to inadvertent security risks can be a daunting task.  To address these 
issues, this project has created Porous, an open source framework specifically for 
creating intentionally vulnerable web applications.  The implementation of Porous 
offers a simplified approach to building realistic vulnerable web applications that may 
be tailored to the needs of specific cyber challenges or classroom exercises. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In today’s era of digital information, web applications, which commonly act as 
publicly facing entities for many businesses and organizations, are often the target of 
malicious attacks by hackers who wish to steal customer data or pivot their way 
deeper into an organization’s internal network.  It is essential that education and 
training for industry professionals has intentionally vulnerable web applications for 
realistic training in how to secure those applications. 
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
There are some web applications available that are designed to be deliberately 
vulnerable for training purposes.  However, many of these vulnerable web applications 
are either outdated, not configurable, are of limited utility for realistic training, or 
consist of static content that limits them to a single time use in training.  Furthermore, 
most training web applications are created from scratch – a very time-consuming and 
difficult task with little to no re-use of the development effort shared amongst 
developers.  To solve this problem, this project implemented a web application 
framework called Porous that simplifies the process of developing configurable 
vulnerable web applications for training purposes by abstracting out the common 
structure and functionalities that are found in a typical web application.  By using 
Porous, application developers will be able to better focus on developing the aspects 
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of an individual web application that makes it unique rather than devoting effort to the 
basic structure of the vulnerable web application. 
1.2 Justification for and Significance of the Study 
According to the Website Security Statistics Report published by Whitehat 
Security [1], an organization that provides website risk management solutions, 
approximately 86% of all surveyed websites have at least one serious vulnerability, 
with most having far more.  Of the vulnerabilities found, only 61% were resolved and 
required an average of 193 days to resolve from the date of first customer notification.  
In addition, only 57% of surveyed organizations said they provide some form of 
software security training to their programmers.  These statistics illustrate the 
overwhelming amount of vulnerabilities that are present in today’s web applications as 
well as the lack of qualified security professionals working within organizations. 
There are two use cases for creating intentionally vulnerable web applications 
within the context of cyber security education.  The first use case, tutorials, require 
stand-alone web applications that reinforce individual lessons or allow students to 
practice a particular technique.  The second use case, for which the Porous framework 
was developed, is cyber challenges.  A cyber challenge is an interactive learning 
environment where students are given hands-on experience practicing cyber security 
skills without the legal or moral implications that are often associated with using such 
techniques in the real world.  The role of web applications within cyber challenges is 
that they simulate the web applications of realistic businesses and organizations.  
Since the individual needs of a business or organization vary drastically, it can be a 
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difficult and time consuming task to build custom web applications for each cyber 
challenge scenario. 
1.3 Goals 
The goal of this project is to create a web application framework that may be used 
to develop intentionally vulnerable web applications.  In order to accomplish this goal, 
the framework must: 
1. Simplify the development of vulnerable web applications 
2. Provide configurable security features 
3. Be evocative of current web application security concerns 
4. Be extensible 
1.4 Summary of Accomplishments 
The result of this project was the creation of the Porous web application 
framework that may be used to develop intentionally vulnerable web applications.  
The Porous framework met the goals specified above in Section 1.3 by implementing 
an extensible structure that allows for the configuration of security features within the 
components that are commonly found in web applications. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
This chapter serves to elaborate on material, both conceptual and technical, that 
has assisted in the development of the web application framework that corresponds to 
the goals of Section 1.3 by providing context, inspiration, and foundational 
information to this research.  The chapter will begin by first defining what exactly a 
web application framework is and how they assist in the development of web 
applications.  Next, it will discuss related works that have had either similar goals or 
are complementary to this project.  Afterwards, there is a discussion of the 
technologies used in the development of the web application framework for this 
project. And lastly, the target audiences that this framework is intended for are 
defined. 
2.1 Web Application Frameworks 
A web application framework is a specific type of software framework that is 
designed for easing the development of web applications and services.  Software 
frameworks are able to ease the development process by providing developers with a 
structured abstraction that contains interfaces to functionalities common to the types of 
applications the framework was built to develop.  In the case of a web application 
framework, the framework may provide interfaces to common web application 
functions such as routing, cookies, session management, and database management.  
The benefit of using such a framework is that code reusability is encouraged thereby 
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facilitating the rapid development of web applications by allowing the application 
developer to focus on the business logic of the application instead of the common 
components.  Web application frameworks and software frameworks in general, can 
be further broken down into Full-Stack, Micro, and Monolithic categories based on 
how influential they intend to be on the structure of the application and how much 
they intend to assist the developer.  I now describe each of those framework 
categories. 
2.1.1 Full-Stack Frameworks 
A full-stack framework is a framework that attempts to provide nearly 
everything that a developer could possibly need to build an application.  It likely 
includes components that may not be needed by the majority of applications, but by 
having them available makes it easier for new features to be integrated.  Examples of 
full-stack web application frameworks include Symfony (PHP) [2], Laravel (PHP) [3], 
Ruby on Rails (Ruby) [4], and Django (Python) [5]. 
 
Figure 1. Sample Architecture of a Full-Stack Framework 
 
 6 
 
2.1.2 Micro Frameworks 
A micro framework is a framework that attempts to provide only the 
components that are absolutely necessary for a developer to build an application; or it 
may focus on providing the functionality of one particular area very efficiently.  Micro 
frameworks tend to be better-suited for smaller applications or for applications that are 
within the very specific purpose for which the framework was designed.  In the case of 
web application frameworks, a micro framework may be specifically designed for 
building the public application programming interfaces (APIs) for another service or 
application.  Micro frameworks often need to be extended with additional components 
in order to make them provide the functionalities required for the web application 
being developed.  Examples of micro web application frameworks includes Slim 
(PHP) [6], Silex (PHP) [7], Sinatra (Ruby) [8], and Flask (Python) [9]. 
 
Figure 2. Sample Architecture of a Micro Framework 
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2.1.3 Monolithic Frameworks 
A monolithic framework is a framework in which the components cannot be 
easily swapped out for different implementations or extended.  Both full-stack and 
micro frameworks can be monolithic, however it is a more common trait in smaller 
micro frameworks.  Slim [6], for example, was developed as a monolithic framework 
until more recently.  The main objective of Slim was to remain lightweight and fast, 
which was accomplished by having a highly optimized code base.  However, this 
came at the cost of having tightly coupled code that could not easily be extended or 
modified without affecting the rest of the framework. 
 
Figure 3. Sample Architecture of a Monolithic Framework 
 
2.2 Related Works 
2.2.1 Open Cyber Challenge Platform 
As mentioned in Section 1.2, one of the motivating factors for developing a web 
application framework is developing intentionally vulnerable web applications for use 
in cyber challenges. Incidentally, creating cyber challenges themselves is a difficult 
and time-consuming task due to the high level of technical ability required to create 
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and implement an individual scenario to be used as a challenge.  To help address this 
problem, researchers at the University of Rhode Island are actively developing the 
Open Cyber Challenge Platform (OCCP) [10], which is an open-source platform for 
building cyber challenges that aims to be extensible, modular, and reusable.  
Considering the similar goals of both projects, the project being completed for this 
these can be seen as a complementary asset to the OCCP.  As the OCCP aims to 
simplify the development of cyber challenges, the framework described in this thesis 
aims to simplify the development of web applications to be used within those 
challenges.  The figure below displays a sample network that the OCCP may generate 
for a scenario.  The web applications developed using the framework may be placed 
within a web server within such a network design. 
 
Figure 4. OCCP Network Diagram 
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2.2.2 Open Web Application Security Project 
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) [11] is a community 
dedicated to the creation of tools, documentation, and technology relating to web 
application security.  For this reason, several of OWASP’s projects were reviewed 
during the completion of this thesis project with the three most significant: The 
OWASP Site Generator, the OWASP Top 10, and the OWASP testing project, 
described below. 
2.2.2.1 OWASP Site Generator 
The OWASP Site Generator [12] project was created and sponsored by 
Foundstone and SPI Dynamics during the OWASP Spring of Code in 2007.  The 
project had intentions of creating a tool that could create dynamic websites using 
predefined vulnerabilities and web architectural elements based on an XML 
configuration file.  The web applications generated by this tool were written in 
Microsoft’s .NET languages. Later efforts sought to expand to include other language 
options.  The project had similar goals of simplifying the development of web 
applications with configurable security features, however it fell short due to other 
design decisions.  First, the sites that it generated were based on predefined templates, 
which limited the customization of the websites being developed.  Second, the tool 
was created as a Windows desktop application and generated websites intended to run 
on Microsoft’ IIS web servers.  This introduced a dependency on the Windows 
operating system that could have severely limited the user base of the tool and limited 
the tool’s utility for use in cyber challenges by specifying a platform for deployment.  
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As of 2008 the project status had changed to inactive, although later efforts to revive 
the project occurred and failed in 2009. 
2.2.2.2 OWASP Top 10 
OWASP categorizes its projects as being in different stages of maturity with the 
most mature projects reaching flagship status, which indicates that the project is not 
only extremely mature but also has the direct support of OWASP as an organization to 
continue to maintain and develop.  Perhaps its most venerated flagship project is the 
OWASP Top 10 [13], which is a list of the top ten most statistically common web 
security concerns.  For each of these security concerns, the OWASP provides example 
vulnerabilities, attacks, reference materials, and suggestions on how to avoid such 
weaknesses.   I used this list as a reference for the types of vulnerabilities to include in 
Porous. 
The most recent list of security flaws at the time of this writing comes from the 
2013 OWASP Top 10, which includes: 
A1. Injection 
Any flaw that allows for untrusted data to be sent to an interpreter as part of a 
command or query, which allows for a malicious user to execute unintended 
commands or access data without authorization.  Example attacks that exploit 
these flaws include SQL injection, operating system command injection, and 
LDAP injection. 
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A2. Broken Authentication and Session Management  
Any flaw associated with the authentication of authorized users and the 
management of sessions.  Example attacks that exploit these flaws include 
password attacks, session fixation, and session hijacking. 
A3. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) 
Any flaw that allows for data to be sent to a client web browser without 
proper validation or escaping, which allows an attack to execute malicious 
scripts. 
A4. Insecure Direct Object References 
Any flaw that exposes a reference to the internal implementation of an artifact 
or asset without proper access controls.  These flaws could allow an attacker 
to view and/or manipulate directories, files, keys, etc. 
A5. Security Misconfiguration 
Any flaw associated with having configuration settings in an application, 
database, server, or other entity that are insecure either by default or by a 
developer’s decision. 
A6. Sensitive Data Exposure 
Any flaw that exposes sensitive data such as customer information, financial 
data, session identifiers, etc. by not properly handling information or not 
encrypting it during rest or while in transit. 
A7. Missing Function Level Access Control 
Any flaw that allows non-privileges users to have access to functions that 
should only be available to authorized users. 
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A8. Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) 
Any flaw that allows an attacker to trick authenticated users into performing 
unintended actions through the use of forged HTTP requests.  
A9. Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities 
Any flaw that results in the exploitation of an application caused by the use of 
vulnerable libraries, components, frameworks, or software.   
A10. Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards 
Any flaw that allows an attacker to take advantage of a redirect or forwarding 
feature in a web application to send a victim to a malicious site or to access 
unauthorized resources. 
2.2.2.3 OWASP Testing Project 
The OWASP Testing Project [14] is another flagship project that aims to 
provide guidelines for the testing of web applications.  The project claims to have 
developed a complete testing framework that can be used as a template for testing 
applications or to qualify the testing processes or others.  It includes testing 
methodologies for each stage of development, as well as recommended procedures for 
testing various parts of a web application.  I used tests from the OWASP Testing 
Project to test the components of Porous.  
2.2.3 Damn Vulnerable Web Application (DVWA) 
The Damn Vulnerable Web Application (DVWA) [15], developed by 
RandomStorm, is an open-source PHP/MySQL web application organized into 
modules associated with specific vulnerabilities, many of which correspond to those 
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described in the OWASP Top 10.  Each of these modules contains a low, medium, and 
high security example implementation that portrays the vulnerability.  I reviewed the 
modules of the DVWA when building the components of Porous.  
Unfortunately, when I worked with them, several of the modules in the DVWA 
had incorrect methods for securing against vulnerabilities [16].  In addition, some 
modules secured against entirely different vulnerabilities than they claimed.  For 
example, the supposed secure implementation of the Brute Force DVWA module still 
allows for brute force attacks.  Furthermore, the low and medium security 
implementations of it do not even portray a brute force attack but rather a SQL 
injection flaw.  Due to these aforementioned reasons, I disregarded the DVWA as a 
reliable source of information for this thesis project. 
2.3 Technologies Used 
2.3.1 LAMP Stack 
According to W3Techs [17], who conduct surveys based on the Alexa top one 
million websites [18], approximately 82% of website whose underlying technologies 
are known are written in PHP.  Additionally, 58.4% use Apache as the web server and 
52.2% use Linux as the operating system on which the server runs.  While no exact 
statistics are provided, MySQL is also claimed to be the most popular open-source 
relational database management system used to store web application data. 
The combination of these technologies make up what is known as the LAMP 
stack (Linux, Apache, MySQL, PHP), which, based on these statistics, is the most 
popular set of technologies used for the development and deployment of web 
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applications.  Consequently, I used these technologies as the basis for the development 
of Porous. 
2.4 Target Audiences 
Based on the goals of this project, three target audiences have been identified as 
potential users of the Porous framework: Framework Developers, Application 
Developers, and Application Users. 
2.4.1 Framework Developers 
Framework developers are users who may contribute to the development of the 
web application framework or its components by extending or modifying it.  In order 
to contribute to the framework and its components, framework developers must have 
advanced knowledge of object-oriented programming and have the necessary security 
knowledge to correctly implement components without introducing inadvertent 
vulnerabilities. 
2.4.2 Application Developers 
Application developers are users who develop web applications using the 
Porous framework.  In order to efficiently develop applications using Porous, 
application developers must have had experience developing web applications with 
other web application frameworks. 
2.4.3 Application Users 
Application users are users who interact with the web applications built using 
the framework.  These users may include students or professionals participating in a 
 15 
 
cyber security course or a cyber challenge.  Depending on the course or challenge, 
application users may be asked to interact with an application in different manners by 
possibly exploiting or patching the application.  Subsequently, the expected 
knowledge of an application user is dependent on how they will be interacting with the 
application.
 16 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter consists of two sections.  The first section, framework architecture, 
delves into the design decisions and implementation details of the framework’s 
structure. It also introduces any concepts or patterns that were employed in its 
construction.  The second section, testing procedures, describes the experiments and 
any metrics, both qualitative and quantitative, which were used to measure how 
effectively the framework was able to satisfy the goals of this project as defined in 
Section 1.3. 
3.1 Framework Architecture 
The architecture of the framework can be divided into three conceptual areas: the 
core, primary components, and auxiliary components.  The core is responsible for 
bootstrapping, configuring, and running a web application.  It also provides the 
extensibility mechanisms necessary for integrating both the primary and auxiliary 
components.  On its own, the core is actually a fully functional micro framework 
comparable to the likes of Silex [7] or Slim [6].  Together with the primary and 
auxiliary components, it lies closer to being a full-stack framework.  I had to make the 
design decision whether to either build on top of one of these existing frameworks or 
to build an entirely new one.  When I was considering building on top of Slim, I 
discovered that it was too restrictive to meet the goals of the project.  Slim aims to be 
as small as possible and therefore did not offer the extensibility or features that were 
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necessary for Porous to meet the goal of section 1.3.  When considering Silex, which 
is built entirely of Symfony components, I decided that a curation of components from 
different members of the open-source community would offer greater flexibility.  
Details of which components I chose, and why, can be seen in Section 3.1.1.   
When designing the framework architecture, I made a distinction between primary 
components, which are directly essential for Porous to meet its goals, and auxiliary 
components, which are not essential for Porous to meet its goals.  I created a different 
implementation of each of the primary components in order to provide both a 
vulnerable and secure version.  These implementations may also include configuration 
options to fine tune their security features.  Conversely, I either developed auxiliary 
components or took them from the community to provide supporting features for the 
application developer, or to act as dependencies for the core or primary components. 
The following diagram displays the overall architecture of the Porous framework.  
The top section shows the architecture of the framework’s core.  The bottom section 
displays a few of the primary and auxiliary components that are included with the 
framework.  Lastly, the middle section shows how these primary and auxiliary 
components connect to the framework’s core.  The subsections that follow will look 
further into the implementation details of the framework’s core, the primary 
components, and the auxiliary components. 
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Figure 5. Architecture of the Porous Framework 
 
3.1.1 Framework Core 
As previously mentioned, the framework core provides the functionality for 
bootstrapping, configuring, and running a web application.  The core is implemented 
as a class called Application, which is the main entry point into any web application 
built using the framework.  An application developer builds applications by calling 
methods from this class.  The Application class contains properties and methods for 
interacting with the rest of the framework’s components, as well as additional helper 
methods for the application developer.  The core’s subcomponents, which were taken 
from the open-source community, include a dependency injection container and a 
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routing layer, which are important aspects in supporting the Porous framework’s 
extensibility 
3.1.1.1 Dependency Injection Container 
Together, the Application class and the dependency injection container act as 
the cornerstone of the framework’s core by being the connective “glue” that binds the 
primary components, the auxiliary components, and any configuration settings 
together in the framework.  The Dependency Injection Container allows for new 
features to be added and for existing components to be swapped out for different 
implementations.  This allows application developers to choose between different 
vulnerable and secure implementations of components at their own discretion, and is 
vital to meeting the goals of the thesis by enabling the framework to be extensible and 
modular. 
In order to fully comprehend the dependency injection container’s role in the 
framework, it is first necessary to understand the related object-oriented design 
principles that it was built to employ.  First is the concept of inversion of control (IoC) 
[19], which is the delegation of control over the program flow to some entity.  A basic 
example of this concept is event driven programming, where instead of being executed 
sequentially, certain instructions are executed upon the arrival of different events.  In 
the case of the framework, the concept of inversion of control is implemented through 
dependency injection, which is a design pattern [19] where the responsibility of 
locating or constructing dependencies is separate from the code that uses those 
dependencies.  The dependency injection pattern can be implemented by either 
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inverting control to a service locator or to a dependency injection container; the latter 
of which is done in the framework. 
Both service locators and dependency injection containers act as a central 
repository for dependency definitions and instructions for their construction.  Service 
locators can in certain circumstances be considered an anti-pattern [20] however, since 
every component that uses the locator is aware of its existence.  Therefore, the locator 
itself is a dependency that must be included in these components.  Conversely, with a 
dependency injection container the components are unaware of the container’s 
existence.  Instead, the application uses reflection, which is the ability for a program to 
inspect itself at runtime, to determine what dependencies need to be constructed and 
injected. 
An example of how these patterns work can be seen in the diagrams of Figure 
6 below.  Diagram A: Class Dependency Map shows the relationship of the classes in 
the secure implementation of the session manager component in which the 
SessionManager class depends on a SessionHandler, which depends on an Encrypter.  
Diagram B: Service Locator shows how the injection of these dependencies would 
work when using the service locator pattern.  The session manager would first ask the 
service locator to locate the session handler.  When the session handler is found it asks 
the locator to locate the encrypter.  Diagram C: Dependency Injection Container 
shows how the injection of these dependencies would work when using the 
dependency injection container pattern.  Here, the application would ask the container 
to construct a session manager.  Using reflection, the container would recognize that 
the session manager requires a session handler parameter to be constructed.  The 
 21 
 
container then checks the service definitions it stores and constructs a session handler.  
This process is repeated when the container recognizes that the handler requires an 
encrypter. 
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Figure 6. Managing Class Dependencies with IoC 
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To further augment the benefits of using a dependency injection container the 
dependency inversion principle is also employed.  The dependency inversion 
principle, which is one of the five basic object-oriented programming and design 
principles as identified by Robert C. Martin [21], states that both high-level and low-
level components should rely on abstractions, rather than concrete implementations.  
The significance of this is that by having components depend on an interface or 
abstract class rather than a specific implementation, the component can be constructed 
using any other component that adheres to the interface or extends the abstract class.  
The diagram in Figure 7 portrays the dependency injection principle being 
employed within the dependency injection container.  This example is identical to that 
of Diagram C in Figure 6 with the exception that the SessionHandler and Encrypter 
classes have been abstracted to interfaces. 
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Figure 7. DI Container with DIP Principle Applied 
 
 
Figure 8 shows the relationship between sample component implementations 
and the provider classes that define their construction details, which are then registered 
in the container for use in the framework. 
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Figure 8. Diagram of Components Registered to Container 
 
When determining which dependency injection container to use in the 
framework, the following contenders from the open-source community were 
considered: 
• Illuminate Container [22]: Created by Taylor Otwell and used in the 
Laravel and Lumen [23] frameworks 
• Pimple  [24]: Created by Fabien Potencier of SensioLabs and used in the 
Silex framework 
• Container  [25]: Created by Phil Bennett and released through The League 
of Extraordinary Packages (The PHP League) 
To decide between these different containers, they were compared for: the 
features they provided, the completeness of their documentation, the state of their 
development, the complexity of their use, and overall size of the code base including 
any dependencies.  This comparison is shown in Table 1.  From it, Phil Bennett’s 
Container was chosen. 
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Table 1. Comparison of Dependency Injection Containers 
Package Features Documentation Development Complexity  Size 
Container      
Illuminate Container      
Pimple      
 
3.1.1.2 Routing Layer 
Web applications operate through the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) 
[26], which expresses the conventions for a transaction of messages between a client 
and server using a stateless request-response pattern.  More specifically, the procedure 
for a HTTP transaction is that a user interacts with a client, typically a web browser, to 
send a request message containing a Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) that identifies 
both the server being contacted and the resource being requested.  The contacted 
server then attempts to locate the resource and returns an appropriate response 
message to the client that is typically a HTML document rendered to the user. This 
interaction is shown in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9. Flow of a HTTP Transaction 
 
In the traditional architecture of a web application, requests to resources within 
the application are handled by individual script files that handle any tasks and return a 
response.  The Porous framework uses an alternative approach called the front-
controller pattern, where all requests are handled at a centralized point and the 
resource itself is either programmatically generated or delegated to by the central 
application.  The role of the routing layer is to handle the request-response process 
from the entry point to the web application.   
The routing layer was created using a combination of open-course components.  
The backbone of this layer consists of the Symfony HttpFoundation [27] component 
and the HttpKernelInterface from the Symfony HttpKernel component [28].  These 
components, amongst others, are part of a set of decoupled libraries used in the 
Symfony framework.  These specific components are also used in other popular 
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frameworks and projects including Silex, Laravel, Lumen, Drupal [29], and phpBB 
[30]. 
In native PHP, data from HTTP request and response messages are stored 
across several of the language’s built-in superglobals, which are predefined variables 
that are accessible everywhere in an application, including in all scopes.  These 
superglobals however, do not conform to the HTTP specification for HTTP request 
and response messages and therefore require developers to address any gaps on their 
own.  As a result, the PHP Framework Interoperability Group (PHP-FIG) [31], which 
is a group of representatives from various projects that creates and votes on standards 
that are used to promote the reusability and sharing of code between each other’s 
projects, has recently voted to accept the PHP Standard Recommendation 7 (PSR-7) 
[32]. PSR-7 defines a set of HTTP message interfaces, therefore providing a common, 
reusable layer for interacting with the HTTP protocol in an object-oriented manner.  
The HttpFoundation component was largely influential in the creation of this standard 
and provides implementations of these interfaces. Furthermore, by using the 
HttpKernelInterface the framework is obligated to handle HTTP transactions by 
accepting a request object and returning a response object. 
The additional impact of using this standardized layer is that project-agnostic 
middleware for hooking into the request-response process can be used by any 
framework or project that implements these components.  Specifically, any project that 
uses the HttpKernelInterface can integrate middleware using the decorator pattern.  
Igor Weidler’s Stack library [33] has been included with the routing layer and 
simplifies the composition of HttpKernelInterface middleware by modeling them as 
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layers being pushed onto a stack.  An example of this can be seen in Figure 10.  The 
request object enters the stack and is processed by each middleware that decorates the 
application. The response object is then processed in a similar fashion. 
 
Figure 10. Stack of Middlewares Decorating Application 
portrays  
 
The actual handling of the request and response objects created using the 
HttpFoundation component is performed by Phil Bennett’s Route package [34].  The 
Route package allows for the definition of resource controllers by specifying a HTTP 
request method and a Uniform Resource Locator (URL).  The package’s router 
inspects incoming requests to obtain this information and passes it to the dispatcher, 
which then interprets this information to locate and dispatch the controller that then 
builds and returns a response.  As opposed to Figure 9, which shows the flow of HTTP 
messages through a basic HTTP transaction, Figure 11 shows the flow of HTTP 
messages as they traverse the routing layer of the application. 
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Figure 11. Routing Flow through Application 
 
 
3.1.2 Primary Components 
The primary components of the framework are those that are necessary to provide the 
dynamic logic of a web application.  These components include a cookie jar, a session 
manager, and a database manager. 
This section will examine both the overall architecture and implementation 
details of each of these components.  Since the goals of the Porous framework 
included being evocative of current vulnerabilities and to provide configurable 
security features, there are two implementations of each component: a base 
implementation with no security features and is therefore vulnerable; and a secure 
implementation with configurable security features to fine tune how secure the 
component is.  When discussing the vulnerabilities exposed or mitigated by these 
components, the associated category from the OWASP Top 10 is referenced in 
parenthesis by its list identifier (A1 – A10). 
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3.1.2.1 Cookie Jar 
The cookie jar component deals with the creation and management of HTTP 
cookies.  HTTP cookies are small pieces of data (limited to 4096 bytes) that are sent in 
the headers of a HTTP response message to be stored as a text file in a client web 
browser.  They are also sent back to the server on each request in the headers of a 
request message.  The data stored in a cookie may vary based on the individual use 
cases of the web application.  Most commonly, cookies are used to store 
personalization settings, tracking information from advertisers, remember-me tokens 
for logging a user back in, and session identifiers, which are used to authenticate users 
of the web application.  Other sensitive information may be stored in a cookie at the 
discretion of the web application developer.  For these reasons, cookies can often be 
the target of malicious users. 
The cookie jar component is the simplest of the three primary components.  It 
is implemented as an abstract class that defines methods for managing instances of the 
Symfony Cookie class, which is part of the HttpFoundation component.  The 
vulnerable and secure implementations of the cookie jar extend this abstract class and 
are required to implement methods for creating cookies and reading cookie data, as 
shown in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12. Architecture of Cookie Jar Component 
 
 
A cookie consists of a name, a value, and a number of attributes that are given 
default values if not specified.  It should be noted that cookie attributes are not sent 
back to the server but are only used by the browser to determine if the cookie should 
be deleted and if the cookie name and value should be sent to the server.  The areas of 
interest regarding the security of cookies includes the value and the attributes.  The 
value of the cookie is the actual data being stored.  The attributes include the 
following: 
• expires – The time the cookie expires set as a Unix timestamp.  If omitted 
or set to zero, the cookie will expire when the client browser closes. 
• domain – The domain or subdomain the cookie is available to. Defaults to 
the domain and all of its subdomains. 
• path – The path on the server the cookie is available to. Defaults to ‘/’, 
which indicates that the cookie will be available within the entire domain. 
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• httponly – Whether or not the cookie is accessible by client-side scripting 
languages such as JavaScript.  Defaults to true. 
• secure – Whether or not the cookie should only be transmitted over a 
secure HTTPS connection.  Defaults to false. 
 
The vulnerable cookie jar implementation creates cookies whose values are 
stored in a plaintext format, which is human readable.  It also leaves all of the 
attributes with their default settings. 
The secure cookie jar implementation is slightly more complex in that it has 
configuration settings to optionally encrypt and optionally sign a cookie’s value using 
the Cryptography auxiliary component described in Section 3.1.3.3.  Encrypting the 
cookie’s value obfuscates its data into ciphertext that is no longer human readable.  In 
order to read the cookie’s value it would first need to be decrypted back to plaintext 
using the same cipher and key used to encrypt it.  Encrypting the cookie’s value 
mitigates possible attacks due to sensitive data exposure (A6).  Signing the cookie’s 
value creates a unique digital signature of the data.  Any change to the cookie’s data 
would result in a different digital signature.  By appending this signature to the cookie 
value the cookie jar component can check if a cookie’s data has been altered by 
unauthorized sources.  This mechanism mitigates cross-site scripting (XSS) (A3) 
attacks in which a malicious user would store JavaScript to be executed in the browser 
inside of the cookie.  Lastly, the secure implementation enables the httponly attribute 
by default, which also mitigates XSS (A3) attacks by preventing scripting languages 
from accessing the cookie. 
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3.1.2.2 Session Manager 
HTTP is a stateless protocol, meaning that data is not preserved when making 
subsequent requests to a web application.  In order to maintain state, sessions are 
employed, which store an identifier cookie on the client side that refers to the actual 
session data stored on the server side.  The session manager component is therefore 
responsible for supervising how both the session identifiers and session data are 
stored.  The data stored in sessions is typically used to authenticate users within a web 
application.  The security of session data is therefore imperative as authenticated users 
may have access to sensitive information or may be given the authorization to perform 
additional functions not intended for unauthorized users.  
The session manager has two parts, the manager itself and the session handlers.  
The manager acts as a wrapper around the functions PHP provides for working with 
sessions, and also provides additional helper methods that allow the application 
developer to add additional security mechanisms.  The manager is implemented as an 
abstract class that is extended by the vulnerable and secure manager implementations.  
The vulnerable implementation simply calls the built-in PHP functions, while the 
secure implementation adds additional logic that is considered to be best practices 
when working with these functions.  For instance, when starting a session on a new 
request, the secure implementation can optionally regenerate the session identifier, 
which can help prevent session fixation attacks since the old identifier is no longer tied 
to the session data.  Additionally, both implementations include methods for the 
application developer to optionally expire a session after a period of idleness, bind a 
session to the IP address and/or user agent of a client, and generate a cross-site request 
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forgery (CSRF) token.  The diagram in Figure 13 shows the architecture of the session 
manager component.  It should be noted that additional abstract session handlers exist, 
however only the AbstractFileSessionHandler is shown for simplicity.  Additional 
information regarding these session handlers is provided in the text that follows. 
 
Figure 13. Architecture of Session Manager Component 
 
 
 The actual storage of session data and construction of session identifiers is 
controlled by PHP’s session handlers, whose methods are kept internal and are not 
exposed to developers.  The functions PHP provides for developers call these internal 
methods to perform their prescribed tasks.  As of PHP 5.4.0, the 
SessionHandlerInterface was introduced, which allows developers to create custom 
session handlers by overriding these internal methods.  The session manager is 
constructed by first passing in an implementation of the SessionHandlerInterface.  
These custom handlers allow developers to control where and how the data is stored 
and how the session identifier cookie is created.  The Porous framework provides four 
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custom session handlers. These include both a vulnerable and secure implementation 
of a file-based handler, and a vulnerable and secure implementation of a database-
based handler.  The secure implementations of the file and database handlers can be 
optionally configured to encrypt the session data and can optionally encrypt, sign, and 
set attributes to the session identifier cookie similarly to what was discussed in the 
previous section.  Additionally, the storage path of file-based sessions can be set. 
The security mechanisms described in this section can help mitigate 
vulnerabilities of sensitive data exposure (A6), flaws due to broken authentication and 
session management (A2), and cross-site request forgery attacks (A8). 
3.1.2.3 Database Manager 
As explained by Anthony Ferrara, a Developer Advocate at Google, a common 
model for web applications is to present them as a union of n-tiers [35] that are 
responsible for conceptually different processes.  Almost all web applications utilize at 
least two tiers that enable their dynamic nature.  The first tier is the application server 
that controls the logical operations of the web application.  The second tier is the 
database that is used to store the actual data used by these logical operations.  The 
database manager component acts as an abstraction layer for communication between 
the application logic and the data stored in the database. 
The implementation of the database manager consists of three subcomponents: 
the database connector, the query builder, and the compiler.  The database connector 
employs the factory pattern to create data source names (DSN), which are formatted 
strings that describe a connection to a data source.  The connector passes this DSN to a 
PHP Data Object (PDO) to create a database connection.  PDO supports drivers for a 
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number of different database types; however the factory only supports creating DSNs 
for MySQL, PostgreSQL, and SQLite at this time. 
The query builder is the main subcomponent with which application 
developers interact.  It is implemented as a fluent interface in which methods are 
chained together to build an object whose properties represent the different clauses of 
a structured query language (SQL) statement.  The utilization of a fluent interface 
gives developers a readable API for building queries.  The query builder is also 
responsible for passing compiled queries to the database connection to be executed.  
The query builder is also implemented as an abstract class whose subclasses are 
responsible for determining how the query is to be executed.  The vulnerable 
implementation uses the PDO’s query method, which simply takes a raw SQL 
statement and executes it on the database server.  The secure implementation uses 
PDO’s prepare and execute methods for creating prepared statements and then binding 
the values of variables to these statements that are then executed.  A prepared 
statement is analogous to a template that is precompiled in the database driver, and 
therefore cannot be modified when variables are passed into it.  As a result, prepared 
statements are immune to SQL injection vulnerabilities (A1), which can cause 
sensitive data exposure (A6) by allowing malicious users to execute statements that 
may read or modify data in the database. 
Below, Figure 14 presents a subset of the state machine for the fluent query 
builder.  Each state represents a method that is chained onto the requisite methods.  
Each query begins by specifying the table you are working with.  There are then 
numerous methods that may be chained together to specify the data you are working 
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with.  A query is completed by calling a method that indicates what is to be done with 
the data. 
 
Figure 14. Subset of Fluent Query Builder State Machine 
 
 
The last subcomponent is the compiler, which takes the properties of a query 
object and translates them into a SQL statement.  The compiler consists of an interface 
that describes the methods needed to generate different types of SQL queries.  The 
vulnerable and secure implementations implement these methods to return raw SQL 
statements and prepared statements with bound parameters, respectively.   
The overall architecture of the database manager component can be seen in 
Figure 15, which also shows the relationships between the database manager’s 
subcomponents.  To recap, the ConnectionFactory creates an implementation of an 
AbstractConnector, which specifies a data source to be used when creating a PDO 
connection.  Query objects are then generated using a fluent interface from an 
implementation of the AbstractQueyBuilder.  These objects are then compiled to SQL 
statements by an implementation of the AbstractCompiler and executed.  
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Figure 15. Architecture of Database Manager Component 
 
3.1.3 Auxiliary Components 
The last part of the framework’s architecture is the addition of auxiliary 
components that act as either dependencies for other components in the framework or 
provide supplementary functionality for application developers to use. These auxiliary 
components include the Event Manager, Logger, Cryptography, Validation, and 
Template Engine. 
3.1.3.1 Event Manager 
The event manager component allows application developers to hook into the 
web application by using the Publish-subscribe design pattern for event-driven 
programming.  By default, the Porous framework has event listeners registered to 
listen for events that occur during the request-response cycle - including when a 
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request is received, a response is created, and when a response is sent back to the 
client.  The event manager may be used to automate logging when events occur, or to 
support the business needs of more complex applications. 
The event manager used in the Porous framework is the open-source package 
aptly called Event, which was developed by Frank de Jonge [36].  Other event 
managers considered for inclusion in the framework included Symfony’s Event 
Dispatcher [37] and Sabre’s Event Emitter [38].  Symfony’s Event Dispatcher is by 
far the most popular solution as it is used by the Symfony framework.  However, it 
introduces several dependencies that would substantially increase the overall size of 
the Porous framework.  Comparatively, neither Event nor Sabre’s Event Emitter 
require any additional dependencies.  I chose Event over Event Emitter due to its more 
exhaustive documentation and due to having more than double the install base 
(~81,000 installations vs ~39,000 at the time of this writing). 
3.1.3.2 Logger 
The logger component was included to allow developers to log different events 
that occur within a web application.  Specific use cases may include to record error 
messages, track data, or to provide and audit trail for different actions.  The log files 
generated by a web application could be used to support application users participating 
in a cyber challenge or to help provide additional information for cyber challenge 
moderators. 
The logging package chosen for inclusion in the framework is Monolog [39], 
which was developed by Jordi Boggiano.  Monolog is the most popular logging library 
available in PHP. 
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3.1.3.3 Cryptography 
The cryptography component is the only auxiliary component that was 
developed rather than taken from the open-source community.  This component is a 
dependency for the secure implementations of both the cookie jar and session manager 
components.  The component includes interfaces for encryption and hashing methods 
as well as an implementation of each interface, as shown in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16. Architecture of Cryptography Component 
 
 
The included Encrypt class acts as a wrapper around PHP’s MCrypt extension 
[40] that can be configured to perform the different types of encryption supported by 
MCrypt.  By default, the Encrypt class is configured to perform encryption using the 
Rijndael algorithm [41], which is used by the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
[42] selected by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). 
The included Hash class acts as a wrapper around PHP’s hash, hash_hmac, 
and password_hash functions and includes helper methods for comparing hash values.  
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The hash function creates a digital signature of data, the hash_hmac function creates a 
keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC), which can be used to sign data, 
and the password_hash function is used specifically for hashing passwords using the 
bcrypt algorithm, which is based on the Blowfish cipher [43].  By default, the Hash 
class is configured to use the SHA-256 algorithm [44] for both the hash and 
hash_hmac functions.  While the password_hash function uses bcrypt, the Hash class 
can override the method to use a less secure hashing algorithm such as MD5 in order 
to introduce vulnerabilities for applications built using this framework. 
3.1.3.4 Validation 
The implementations of the primary components are able to introduce and 
mitigate a wide range of vulnerabilities.  However, they do not support any form of 
data validation, which can be imperative when properly securing a web application.  
Since the validation of data is reliant on the context and type of data being validated, it 
is left to the application developer to properly perform.  To secure a web application it 
is expected that all user input is filtered when output.  The validation library I chose 
for inclusion in the Porous framework is Respect’s Validation developed by Henrique 
Moody [45].  According to Chris Cornutt, PHP security expert and member of 
Hewlett-Packard’s Global Cyber Securtiy Group, Respect’s Validation library has 
become one of the de-facto standards for doing data validation in PHP [46]. 
3.1.3.5 Template Engine 
A template engine was included in the framework to assist application 
developers in creating the HTML documents for their web applications.  Three 
 43 
 
different template libraries were considered for the framework including SensioLab’s 
Twig [47], Illuminate’s Blade [48], and the PHP League’s Plates [49].  Both Twig and 
Blade are compiled templates, while Plates is a native template engine that was 
inspired by Twig. When considering these options, size was a major determining 
factor in choosing which engine to include. With its dependencies Illuminate’s Blade 
is ~3 MB in size, Twig ~1 MB, and Plates only ~40 KB.  Ultimately, I chose Plates for 
the Porous framework due to its size and minimal learning curve.  
3.2 Testing Procedures 
The previous section described the methodologies used to implement the Porous 
web application framework.  This section will identify the experiments that were 
conducted and how they were used to evaluate the effectiveness of this solution in 
meeting the goals defined in Section 1.3. 
3.2.1 Primary Component Vulnerability Tests 
The first set of experiments conducted were used to assess the presence of 
vulnerabilities in the framework’s primary components.  Each of these experiments, 
unless otherwise noted, were conducted twice: once for the vulnerable 
implementation, and once for the secure implementation with its security features 
configured.  In order to test for vulnerabilities in these components, tests directly from 
the OWASP Testing Guide (OTG) [14] were used when applicable.  These tests are 
referenced by their identifier in the form of OTG-CATEGORY-###.  It should be 
noted that in many cases only portions of an OTG test were completed since a 
considerable amount of them rely on an application’s business logic rather than a 
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component’s implementation.  In cases where no OTG test was available to assess a 
vulnerability, additional procedures were established by considering information from 
the OWASP Top 10 or through general understanding of security principles and the 
underlying technologies. 
A summary of these tests can be seen in the table below: 
 
Table 2. Summary of Primary Component Tests 
Cookie Jar Tests 
Test Description 
Testing for Cookies Attributes (OTG-SESS-002) Tests the appropriate setting of 
cookie attributes. 
Testing for Information Leakage (Segment of 
OTG-SESS-001) 
Tests the human readability of 
cookie data. 
Testing for Tamper Resistance (Segment of 
OTG-SESS-001 
Tests for the ability to modify 
cookie data.  
Session Manager Tests 
Test Description 
Testing for Cookies Attributes (OTG-SESS-002) Tests the appropriate setting of 
session cookie attributes. 
Testing for Information Leakage (Segment of 
OTG-SESS-001) 
Tests the human readability of the 
session identifier and stored 
session data. 
Testing for Tamper Resistance (Segment of 
OTG-SESS-001 
Tests for the ability to modify 
session cookie data.  
Testing for Session Fixation (Segment of OTG-
SESS-003) 
Tests the regeneration of session 
identifiers. 
Testing for Cross Site Request Forgery (OTG-
SESS-005) 
Tests for possibility of CSRF 
attacks. 
Testing for Session Validity (OTG-SESS-007) Tests the ability to verify a 
session’s authenticity. 
Database Manager Tests 
Test Description 
Testing for SQL Injection (OTG-INPVAL-005) Tests the possibility of SQL 
injection. 
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3.2.1.1 Cookie Jar Tests 
To test for vulnerabilities in the different implementations of the cookie jar 
component the following experiments were performed: 
3.2.1.1.1 Testing for Cookie Attributes (OTG-SESS-002) 
The purpose of this experiment was to verify that appropriate default settings 
for cookie attributes were applied to cookies generated by the cookie jar component.  
More specifically, this experiment tested for the enabling of the httponly attribute, 
which when enabled, prevents access to cookies from client-side scripting languages 
such as JavaScript.  The omission of this attribute introduces a vulnerability to cross-
site scripting (XSS) attacks. 
It should be noted that the referenced test OTG-SESS-02 also recommends 
testing the secure, domain, path, and expires attributes.  However, the setting of these 
attributes is dependent on the context of the cookie within the application, and is 
therefore left to the application developer to implement correctly.  Therefore, rather 
than testing for an appropriate default setting, I tested the ability to set these attributes 
instead. 
To perform this experiment, a web application was created that generated a 
cookie.  The attributes and their values were then inspected by observing the HTTP 
response headers sent by the web application using the OWASP Zed Attack Proxy 
(ZAP) [50], an intercepting proxy and web application penetration testing tool. 
3.2.1.1.2 Testing for Information Leakage (Segment of OTG-SESS-001) 
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The purpose of this experiment was to check for the possibility of information 
leakage by storing the cookie’s data in plaintext, a human readable format.  The 
storing of data in plaintext introduces a vulnerability to sensitive data exposure 
through network eavesdropping or local machine access. 
To perform this experiment a web application was created that generated a 
cookie with a name of “foo” and a value of “bar”.  Using ZAP, the HTTP response 
headers were inspected to check the readability of the cookie’s value. 
3.2.1.1.3 Testing for Tamper Resistance (Segment of OTG-SESS-001) 
This purpose of this experiment was to test a cookie’s resistance to malicious 
attempts of modification.  A lack of resistance to such modification introduces a 
vulnerability to an exploit known as cookie tampering (also known as cookie 
poisoning), which may be used to perform a variety of attacks. 
To perform this experiment, a web application was created that generated a 
cookie named “foo” with a value of “bar”.  The web application then rendered the 
value of the cookie by printing it in the client web browser, Google Chrome.  The 
value of the cookie was then modified using the Google Chrome extension 
EditThisCookie.  Once modified, the resource that rendered the cookie’s value was 
refreshed and the value printed in the browser was inspected. 
3.2.1.2 Session Manager Tests 
The tests in this section were performed to test for vulnerabilities in the session 
manager component and its session handlers.  Additionally, tests were performed to 
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verify that the helper methods provided for application developers were functioning 
properly. 
3.2.1.2.1 Testing for Cookie Attributes (OTG-SESS-002) 
The purpose and procedure of this experiment is identical to that of experiment 
3.2.1.1.1, but within the context of a session cookie, which is handled independently 
of the cookie component.  In addition to the httponly attribute, the configuration of the 
secure attribute was tested. 
3.2.1.2.2 Testing for Information Leakage (Segment of OTG-SESS-001) 
The purpose and procedure of this experiment is identical to that of experiment 
3.2.1.1.2, but within the context of a session cookie.  In addition, the possibility of 
information leakage of session data stored on the server was tested by its readability as 
plaintext.  Depending on the handler, the data was inspected either in the session files 
or the database table in which sessions were stored. 
3.2.1.2.3 Testing for Tamper Resistance (Segment of OTG-SESS-001) 
The purpose and procedure of this experiment are identical to that of 
experiment of 3.2.1.1.3, but within the context of a session cookie. 
3.2.1.2.4 Testing for Session Fixation (Segment of OTG-SESS-003) 
The purpose of this experiment was to test if sessions are vulnerable to fixation 
attacks.  A session fixation attack occurs when an attacker forces a session identifier 
for a web application upon a victim. When the victim authenticates themselves with 
the web application, the same session identifier is used.  Since the attacker knows 
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what the identifier is, the attacker is able to hijack the session by using the now 
authenticated identifier. 
To perform this experiment, a web application was created that requires a user 
to authenticate themselves using a predetermined set of credentials to access an 
administrative area.  Firefox was then used to access the application and start a 
session.  The session cookie was then copied into Google Chrome.  The application 
was then logged into from Chrome using the predefined credentials.  It was then 
checked if the administrative area could be accessed through Firefox. 
3.2.1.2.5 Testing for Cross Site Request Forgery (OTG-SESS-005) 
The purpose of this experiment was to test for the possibility of cross site 
request forgery (CSRF) attacks by verifying a web application’s trust in requests from 
users that are made to it.  Specifically, this experiment tests the Session Manager’s 
methods for generating and verifying a CSRF token that is stored in a session’s data. 
To perform this experiment a web application was created that allows 
authenticated users to delete a database entry by submitting a form.  After logging into 
the application a second web application was accessed that contained a hidden form 
that forges a request to the first application.  It was then checked if the first web 
application honored the request and deleted the database entry. 
3.2.1.2.6 Testing for Session Validity (Includes OTG-SESS-007) 
The purpose of this experiment was two-fold: to test the session manager’s 
ability to identify a user based on their user-agent and/or IP address and to test the 
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session manager’s ability to invalidate a session after a defined period of inactivity.  
This functionality provides a rudimentary defense against session hijacking attacks. 
To perform this experiment, a web application was created that starts a session.  
Using OWASP ZAP, HTTP requests were then created that contained headers with 
user-agents and IP addresses that were different than the ones that started the session.  
It was then checked if the web application invalidated the session due to these 
changes.  Additionally, the timeout functionality was tested for correctness by setting 
a predefined idle time and checking for a timeout after the prescribed amount of time. 
3.2.1.3 Database Manager Tests 
To test for vulnerabilities in the different implementations of the database 
manager component the following experiments were performed: 
3.2.1.3.1 Testing for SQL Injection (OTG-INPVAL-005) 
The purpose of this experiment was to determine if the queries compiled by the 
database manager component were vulnerable to SQL injection attacks, which could 
allow malicious users to read or modify the contents of a database potentially exposing 
sensitive data or causing harm to an organization. 
To perform this experiment, a web application was created with the 
functionalities to create, read, update, and delete data from a database containing 
dummy data.  Each of these operations were tested using SQLMap [49], an open-
source penetration testing tool that automates the detection and exploitation of SQL 
injection flaws. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
FINDINGS 
 
This chapter presents the results that were gathered by performing the experiments 
described in Section 3.2. 
4.1 Primary Component Vulnerability Results 
This set of experiments set out to assess the presence of vulnerabilities in the 
proposed vulnerable and secure implementations of each of the primary components.  
A summary of these results is shown in the table below followed by individual results 
for each of these experiments. 
 
Table 3. Summary of Primary Component Tests Results 
Cookie Jar Tests 
Test Pass / Fail 
Testing for Cookies Attributes (OTG-SESS-002) Pass 
Testing for Information Leakage (Segment of OTG-SESS-001) Pass 
Testing for Tamper Resistance (Segment of OTG-SESS-001 Pass 
Session Manager Tests 
Test Description 
Testing for Cookies Attributes (OTG-SESS-002) Pass 
Testing for Information Leakage (Segment of OTG-SESS-001) Pass 
Testing for Tamper Resistance (Segment of OTG-SESS-001 Pass 
Testing for Session Fixation (Segment of OTG-SESS-003) Pass 
Testing for Cross Site Request Forgery (OTG-SESS-005) Pass 
Testing for Session Validity (OTG-SESS-007) Pass 
Database Manager Tests 
Test Description 
Testing for SQL Injection (OTG-INPVAL-005) Pass 
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4.1.1 Cookie Jar Results 
To revisit the exact details of each of the following experiments for the cookie 
jar component refer to section 3.2.1.1. 
4.1.1.1 Testing for Cookie Attributes (OTG-SESS-002) 
This experiment set out to verify that the appropriate default configuration 
settings for cookie attributes were applied to each implementation of the cookie jar 
component.  The results of this experiment were gathered by visual inspection of the 
HTTP response headers sent by the web application using the OWASP ZAP tool.  
Upon inspection of these headers, I determined that each vulnerable and secure 
implementations set the httponly attribute by having it set to false and true, 
respectively.  Additionally, both implementations able to correctly set the secure, 
domain, path, and expires attributes on demand.   
As a result of this experiment, I concluded that the vulnerable and secure 
implementations of the cookie jar component can accurately expose and mitigate 
vulnerabilities associated with setting of cookie attributes including certain instances 
of XSS attacks (A3). 
4.1.1.2 Testing for Information Leakage (Segment of OTG-SESS-001) 
This experiment set out to check for the possibility of information leakage 
caused by the storage of data in a cookie’s value in a human readable plaintext format.  
The results of this experiment were gathered by visually inspecting the HTTP 
response headers using the OWASP ZAP tool.  Upon inspection of these headers I saw 
that the vulnerable implementation of the cookie jar showed the expected value of 
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“bar”.  Contrarily, the secure implementation obfuscated the data by utilizing the 
Cryptography component to encrypt and encode the cookie’s value.  The exact values 
that were stored in the cookies tested during this experiment are in the table below. 
 
Table 4. Testing for Information Leakage Comparison 
Implementation Cookie Value 
Vulnerable bar 
Secure GmNegLfvVYlhG1gde4vs5NVIrkw01WUv2FEWcGuuI0c%
3D 
 
As a result of this experiment, I concluded that the vulnerable and secure 
implementations of the cookie jar component can accurately expose and mitigate 
sensitive data exposure vulnerabilities (A6) associated with the storing of cookie data 
in plaintext. 
4.1.1.3 Testing for Tamper Resistance (Segment of OTG-SESS-001) 
This experiment set out to determine if a cookie was resistant to malicious 
attempts of modification.  The results of this experiment were gathered by visually 
inspecting the output of the web application that rendered the cookie value in the web 
browser.  Upon inspection of the rendered web page I saw that a cookie created using 
the vulnerable implementation could be modified and have its value rendered as 
normal.  Contrarily, the value of a cookie created using the secure implementation was 
not rendered in the browser.  Instead, the web application simply ignored the cookie 
altogether.  This was due to the fact that the signature generated from the modified 
data could not be validated against the signature that was generated by the original 
data.  In order to successfully modify a cookie’s data an attacker would need to 
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reverse engineer the algorithm used to create the signature.  By default, the cookie jar 
component uses an HMAC code to sign the data that would require the attacker to also 
gain access to the key used in the algorithm.  However, the cookie jar can also be 
configured to use a weaker algorithm such as MD5, which is easily recognizable.  If 
recognized, the attacker could then modify the cookie.  The values rendered in the 
browser for the cookie data before and after modification are in the tables below. 
Table 5. Cookie Data before Modification 
Implementation Stored Value Value Displayed 
Vulnerable bar bar 
Secure (HMAC) bar--
14b473a0d902a7a38187d2b2bc2
e092d63050b110c9d9fe04be342
cf97581eb5 
bar 
Secure (MD5) bar--
37b51d194a7513e45b56f6524f2
d51f2 
bar 
 
Table 6. Cookie Data after Modification 
Implementation Stored Value Value Displayed 
Vulnerable qux qux 
Secure (HMAC) qux  
Secure (HMAC) qux--
14b473a0d902a7a38187d2b2bc2
e092d63050b110c9d9fe04be342
cf97581eb5 
 
Secure (MD5) qux--
37b51d194a7513e45b56f6524f2
d51f2 
 
Secure (MD5 – 
Recognized) 
qux--
d85b1213473c2fd7c2045020a6b
9c62b 
qux 
 As a result of this experiment, I concluded that the vulnerable and secure 
implementations of the cookie jar component accurately expose and mitigate 
vulnerabilities associated with the tampering of cookie data at a granular level. 
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4.1.2 Session Manager Results 
To revisit the exact details of each of the following tests for the session 
manager component, refer to section 3.2.1.2. 
4.1.2.1 Testing for Cookie Attributes (OTG-SESS-002) 
This experiment set out to verify that the appropriate default configuration 
settings were set for the attributes of a session cookie.  The results of this experiment 
are nearly identical to those found in Section 4.1.1.1.  The exception to these results is 
due to the additional requirement that the secure implementations of the session 
handlers are configured to have session cookies sent over an encrypted connection by 
enabling the secure attribute.  Upon visual inspection, I determined that the setting of 
this attribute was correct for both the vulnerable and secure implementations of the 
session handlers. 
As a result of this experiment, I concluded that the vulnerable and secure 
implementations of the session handlers can correctly expose or mitigate 
vulnerabilities associated with the cookie attributes of a session cookie.  These include 
possible vulnerabilities due to broken authentication and session management (A2), 
XSS (A3), and sensitive data exposure (A6). 
4.1.2.2 Testing for Information Leakage (Segment of OTG-SESS-001) 
This experiment set out to identify the possibility of information leakage by 
both the session cookie and the session data stored on the server.  The results 
pertaining to the session cookie are identical to those in Section 4.1.1.2.  The results of 
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testing for information leakage in the session data was concluded in a similar manner 
by visually inspecting the location in which the session data was stored.   
The vulnerable implementations of the session handlers store session data as 
key-value pairs in a human readable plaintext format.  Conversely, the secure 
implementations of the session handlers store data in an obfuscated format that has 
been serialized as well as encrypted and encoded like the secure cookies.  The exact 
data stored by the session handlers can be seen in the table below. 
 
Table 7. Comparison of Stored Session Data 
Implementation Session Data 
Vulnerable s:52:"username|s:7:"johndoe";email|s:16:"jdo
e@example.com";"; 
Secure s:108:"lvbdVMs9VMmMulAOkbrsGr00QMfVf/c8k0Vod
UfJtmMkdIW6ZDoL/6iS8Ut8Xfdp/gQoioxkAx1Q7Hlo2
Rrgu5uf7lqIL0RcJOO0ZcDP8qM="; 
 
 As a result of this experiment, I  concluded that the vulnerable and secure 
session handlers correctly store data to expose and mitigate vulnerabilities pertaining 
to the leakage of information from session data.  This includes possible vulnerabilities 
due to broken authentication and session management (A2), XXS (A3), and sensitive 
data exposure (A6). 
4.1.2.3 Testing for Tamper Resistance (Segment of OTG-SESS-001) 
This experiment set out to determine if a session cookie was resistant to 
malicious attempts of modification.  The results of this experiment are identical to 
those in Section 4.1.1.3.  However, additional implications of these results include the 
possible exposure to and mitigation of session hijacking attacks. 
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4.1.2.3.1 Testing for Session Fixation (Segment of OTG-SESS-003) 
This experiment set out to specifically determine if sessions could possibly be 
vulnerable to certain incarnations of session fixation attacks.  The results of this 
experiment were gathered by visually inspecting session cookies to see if their 
identifiers were regenerated and by attempting to bypass the authentication 
mechanism of the login form to directly access the administrative section of the web 
application.  With the vulnerable implementation of the session manager, the session 
identifier is never regenerated.  Therefore, when a session was authenticated in one 
browser it was also authenticated in the other browser that shared the same session 
identifier.  Contrarily, with the secure implementation the session identifier was 
regenerated on each request, which invalidated the old session identifier after logging 
into the application. 
As a result of this experiment, I  concluded that the vulnerable and secure 
implementations of the session manager component appropriately expose and mitigate 
session fixation attacks (A2) that are reliant on the regeneration of session identifiers. 
4.1.2.4 Testing for Cross Site Request Forgery (OTG-SESS-005) 
This experiment set out to determine if the methods in the session manager 
could be used to verify a request coming into the application through the use of a 
CSRF token.  The results of this experiment showed that these methods were working 
as intended since the forged request was not honored by the application.  A CSRF 
token is stored in a user’s session data and is regenerated on every request.  This token 
must appear as a hidden form field in any form that is submitted to the application in 
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order to be verified.  Since the forged request did not contain the session’s token it was 
ignored by the application. 
As a result of this experiment, I concluded that these methods do function 
correctly and may be used by the application developer to prevent CSRF attacks. 
4.1.2.5 Testing for Session Validity (Includes OTG-SESS-007) 
This experiment set out to determine if the methods in the session manager 
component could be used to check the validity of a session by associating it with 
client-specific data.  The results of this experiment were gathered by inspecting the 
behaviors of the web application when HTTP request headers were forged with 
different user-agent strings and IP addresses.  The results of this experiment showed 
that these methods were working as intended since the web application denied access 
to an authorized-only area of the web application.  The timeout functionality of the 
session manager also worked as intended.  When a request was made after an allowed 
period of idle time of three minutes, the session was destroyed. 
As a result of this experiment, I concluded that these methods do function 
correctly and may be used by the application developer to introduce additional 
security features to a web application. 
4.1.3 Database Manager Results 
To revisit the exact details of each of the following tests for the database 
manager component refer to section 3.2.1.3. 
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4.1.3.1 Testing for SQL Injection (OTG-INPVAL-005) 
This experiment set out to determine if the queries compiled by the database 
manager component were vulnerable to SQL injection attacks (A1).  This experiment 
was broken down into separate tests for each of the major query operations: select, 
insert, update, and delete.  The results of running SQLMap against different parts of a 
web application that uses these queries showed that the vulnerable implementation 
was vulnerable to SQL injection in all four cases.  More specifically, SQLMap found 
the queries vulnerable to Boolean-based blind injection, error-based injection, 
AND/OR time-based blind injection and union query injection.  As expected, 
SQLMap was unable to perform any injection attacks on the secure implementation of 
the component.  As a result, I concluded that the vulnerable and secure 
implementations of the database manager component correctly expose or mitigate 
SQL injection vulnerabilities. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
The previous chapter presented the results that were collected by testing the web 
application framework designed and implemented using the methodologies described 
in Chapter 3.  This chapter will now reflect on those methodologies and review the 
testing results to make implications regarding whether or not the methodologies used 
to develop the web application framework were able to achieve the goals defined in 
Section 1.3. 
5.1.1 Goal 1 Conclusions 
The first goal of this project was to develop a web application framework that is 
able to simplify the development of vulnerable web applications.  The framework 
developed in this thesis was able to simplify the development of web applications by 
providing abstractions and interfaces to common web functionalities including routing 
and the management of sessions, cookies, and databases.  This is evidenced by the 
creation of the primary components, which include methods for providing these 
functionalities.  Furthermore, many of these abstractions were due to the inclusion of 
popular community projects and standards set by the PHP-FIG that were created 
specifically for simplifying the development of PHP web applications.  Based on the 
application developer target audience, which was defined to have had experience with 
developing applications using native PHP and other web application frameworks, the 
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developers creating applications should already have a familiarity with some of these 
components such as the HttpFoundation component and the HttpKernelInterface.  
In addition, the Porous framework specifically sought to simplify the development 
of vulnerable web applications. This was achieved by building on these components 
and making abstractions to different security implementations of components.  This 
was verified by the various primary component tests. 
5.1.2 Goal 2 Conclusions 
The second goal of this project was to develop a web application framework that 
provides configurable security features for introducing vulnerabilities to web 
applications.  This goal was achieved by the inclusion of both a vulnerable and secure 
implementation of each primary component.  As described in the methodologies 
sections for each component, the base implementation contains no security options by 
default.  The secure implementations however, provide configuration options to 
granularly control the security mechanism for each component.  For instance, the 
cookie jar component provides the options of whether or not to encrypt a cookie, sign 
a cookie, and what algorithms are used to do either of these tasks.  The session 
component provides these same options for its identifier as well as options to 
regenerate the identifier and change its default name.  The session data may also be 
optionally encrypted and stored in non-default locations.  Lastly, the database 
component can be configured to use raw SQL statements or prepared statements.  
Each of these configuration options were again tested during the primary component 
tests and are configurable by setting these options in a main configuration file for the 
application. 
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5.1.3 Goal 3 Conclusions 
The third goal of this project was to develop a web application framework that is 
evocative of current web application security concerns.  This has been evidenced 
throughout the primary component tests that reference the categories of vulnerabilities 
that the various security mechanisms expose or mitigate from the OWASP Top 10.   
The test results show which of the categories of vulnerabilities can be directly 
exposed and mitigated by configuring the primary components of the framework.  The 
table below provides a mapping of these categories to the components that are 
affected. 
Table 8. OWASP Top 10 Vulnerabilities Exposed and Mitigated 
OWASP Top 10 Category Components Affected 
A1 – Injection Database 
A2 – Broken Authentication and Session 
Management 
Cookie, Session 
A3 – Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Cookie, Session 
A4 – Insecure Direct Object References --- 
A5 – Security Misconfiguration Cookie, Session, Database 
A6 – Sensitive Data Exposure Cookie, Session, Database 
A7 – Missing Function Level Access --- 
A8 – Cross-Site Request Forgery --- 
A9 – Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities Cookie, Session, Database 
A10 – Unvalidated Redirected and Forwards --- 
 
Based on these results, the configuration of the primary components directly 
addresses six of the ten categories.  The remaining four categories may be addressed 
by the business logic of the application. 
A4 – Insecure Direct Object References refers to flaws that expose a reference to 
resources without any proper restrictions.  The example attack provided by the 
OWASP Top 10 for this vulnerability is when an application uses unverified data to 
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access the account information for another user.  The solution to preventing this type 
of an attack would be to validate that the account information for the logged in user 
matches the account information being modified.  This could be handled by using a 
combination of logic from the session manager and/or auxiliary validation component. 
A7 – Missing Function Level Access refers to flaws that allow non-privileged users 
to access functions that should only be available to authorized users.  The example 
attack provided by the OWASP Top 10 for this vulnerability is when an attacker 
accesses a URL that should only be available to authorized users.  Again, this can be 
prevented using either the session manager or validation component to ensure that a 
user accessing a URL has the correct level of authorization to access the resource. 
A8 – Cross-Site Request Forgery refers to flaws where an attacker tricks 
authenticated users into performing unintended actions through the use of forged 
HTTP requests.  While the session manager component does contain methods for 
generating and verifying CSRF tokens it does not support the injection of these tokens 
into the HTML of a rendered web page as a hidden form field.  It would be up to the 
application developer to individually add these hidden form fields to every form they 
use in their application. 
A10 – Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards refers to flaws where an attacker takes 
advantage of a redirect or forward feature within a web application to send a victim to 
a malicious location or to access unauthorized resources.  The solution to this category 
of flaws would be to not use redirects or forwards that allow for user parameters.  If 
allowed, then the user input should be validated using the validation component. 
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Overall, based on this information the Porous framework can be seen as evocative 
of current web application security concerns through direct and indirect use of the 
primary and auxiliary components 
5.1.4 Goal 4 Conclusions 
The fourth goal of this project was to create a web application framework that is 
extensible.  Proof that this goal was achieved can be seen in the architecture of the 
Porous framework’s core.  The dependency injection container allows components to 
be added and swapped into the framework by storing definitions that provide the 
construction details of each component.  Each component, both primary and auxiliary, 
was added to the framework by writing these service provider definitions and 
registering them with the container.  Additionally, the routing component, which is 
based on the HttpFoundation component and the HttpKernelInterface allows for 
community middleware to be added to the framework.  Together, the dependency 
injection container and routing layer provide the extensibility that was desired to meet 
this goal. 
5.2 Future Work 
The Porous framework developed for this project was able to successfully meet 
each of the four goals described above.  However, at this point the Porous framework 
is still in its infancy and additional work can and should be done to bring this project 
to its fullest potential.  Over the course of developing this framework the following 
areas of future work are seen as parts of the framework that may be developed at a 
later time. 
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5.2.1 Further Evaluation 
Perhaps the most important consideration when drawing conclusions from the 
results of the experiments conducted on this framework is that no implementation is 
ever going to be completely secure against all vulnerabilities.  Additional testing 
should be done to check for vulnerabilities that were overlooked or missed during the 
completion of this project.  It would be beneficial for other developers and security 
experts to audit the code of this framework in order to locate any of these 
vulnerabilities and provide any additional insights on how to prevent them. 
5.2.2 Additional Components and Implementations 
Another future extension to this project would be to construct additional 
components or implementations of existing components.  This would allow for added 
customization for application developers who may be seeking particular functionalities 
for the web applications that they build.  Suggested components to be added to the 
framework would be authentication and authorization libraries for managing users. 
5.2.3 Intrusion Detection System 
The next area of future work would be the possible integration of an intrusion 
detection system. An intrusion detection system could be of use when web 
applications built using the framework are used in a cyber challenge.  This, combined 
with the event manager component, could provide application users or challenge 
moderators with a means of logging the exact exploitations that take place within the 
vulnerable components of the framework.  Existing intrusion detection systems may 
be looked at as possible candidates for inclusion in later releases of the framework. 
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5.2.4 Command Line Interface 
A command line interface to the framework would be a nicety for application 
developers by providing them with tools to generate keys, application templates, and 
content.  Additionally, a command line interface could include the functions for 
database migrations and seeding, which would accelerate the process of some of this 
other content generation.  
5.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the Porous web application framework was successful in meeting its 
goals. It has the potential to be a significant contributor to the open-source community 
and cyber security communities by allowing them to develop realistic vulnerable web 
applications relatively simply and have these web applications be easily extensible to 
facilitate reuse.  While this project was successful, it should be seen as just the 
beginning as the framework should continue to grow over time. 
 66 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
[1]  WhiteHat Security, "Website Security Statistics Report," WhiteHat Security, May 
2013. 
[2]  Sensio Labs, "Symfony Framework," Sensio Labs, [Online]. Available: 
https://symfony.com/. [Accessed 18 June 2015]. 
[3]  Laravel, "Laravel: The PHP Framework for Artisans," [Online]. Available: 
http://laravel.com/. [Accessed 18 June 2015]. 
[4]  Ruby on Rails, "Ruby on Rails," [Online]. Available: http://rubyonrails.org/. 
[Accessed 18 June 2015]. 
[5]  Django, "Django," Django, [Online]. Available: https://www.djangoproject.com/. 
[Accessed 18 June 2015]. 
[6]  J. Lockheart, "Slim Framework," Slim Framework, [Online]. Available: 
http://www.slimframework.com/. [Accessed 18 June 2015]. 
[7]  Sensio Labs, "Silex The PHP micro-framework based on the Symfony2 
Components," [Online]. Available: http://silex.sensiolabs.org/. [Accessed 18 June 
2015]. 
[8]  Sinatra, "Sinatra," [Online]. Available: http://www.sinatrarb.com/. [Accessed 18 
June 2015]. 
[9]  "Armin Ronacher," [Online]. Available: http://flask.pocoo.org/. [Accessed 18 
June 2015]. 
[10]  University of Rhode Island, "Open Cyber Challenge Platform," [Online]. 
Available: https://opencyberchallenge.net/. [Accessed 18 June 2015]. 
[11]  Open Web Application Security Project, "Open Web Application Security 
Project," [Online]. Available: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Main_Page. 
[Accessed 18 June 2015]. 
[12]  Open Web Application Security Project, "OWASP Site Generator," [Online]. 
Available: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_SiteGenerator. [Accessed 
18 June 2015]. 
[13]  Open Web Applicaiton Security Project, "OWASP Top 10," [Online]. Available: 
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project. 
[Accessed 18 June 2015]. 
 67 
 
[14]  Open Web Application Security Project, "OWASP Testing Project," [Online]. 
Available: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Testing_Project. 
[Accessed 18 June 2015]. 
[15]  RandomStorm, "Damn Vulnerable Web Application," [Online]. Available: 
http://www.dvwa.co.uk/. [Accessed 18 June 2015]. 
[16]  Github, "Github RandomStorm DVWA Issues," [Online]. Available: 
https://github.com/RandomStorm/DVWA/issues. [Accessed 18 June 2015]. 
[17]  Q-Success, "W3Techs - World Wide Web Technology Surveys," [Online]. 
Available: http://w3techs.com/. [Accessed 18 June 2015]. 
[18]  Alexa, "Alexa," Amazon, [Online]. Available: http://www.alexa.com/. [Accessed 
15 June 2015]. 
[19]  M. Fowler, "Inversion of Control Containers and the Dependency Injection 
pattern," [Online]. Available: 
http://www.martinfowler.com/articles/injection.html. [Accessed 18 June 2015]. 
[20]  M. Seemann, "Service Locator is an Anti-Pattern," [Online]. Available: 
http://blog.ploeh.dk/2010/02/03/ServiceLocatorisanAnti-Pattern/. [Accessed 15 
June 2015]. 
[21]  R. C. Martin, "Design Principles and Design Patterns," [Online]. Available: 
http://www.objectmentor.com/resources/articles/Principles_and_Patterns.pdf. 
[Accessed 18 June 2015]. 
[22]  Illuminate, "Github Illuminate Container," [Online]. Available: 
https://github.com/illuminate/container. [Accessed 18 June 2015]. 
[23]  "Lumen," [Online]. Available: http://lumen.laravel.com/. [Accessed 18 June 
2015]. 
[24]  Sensio Labs, "Pimple A Simple Dependency Injection Container," [Online]. 
Available: http://pimple.sensiolabs.org/. [Accessed 18 June 2015]. 
[25]  The League of Extraordinary Packages, "Container," [Online]. Available: 
http://container.thephpleague.com/. [Accessed 18 June 2015]. 
[26]  Network Working Group, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1," World 
Wide Web Consortium, [Online]. Available: 
http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616.html. [Accessed 15 Jun 2015]. 
[27]  SensioLabs, "The HttpFoundation Component," SensioLabs, [Online]. Available: 
http://symfony.com/doc/current/components/http_foundation/introduction.html. 
 68 
 
[Accessed 15 June 2015]. 
[28]  Sensio Labs, "The HTTPKernel Component," [Online]. Available: 
http://symfony.com/doc/current/components/http_kernel/introduction.html. 
[Accessed 18 June 2015]. 
[29]  Drupal, "Drupal," [Online]. Available: https://www.drupal.org/. [Accessed 18 
June 2015]. 
[30]  
 
phpBB, "phpBB," [Online]. Available: https://www.phpbb.com/. [Accessed 18 
June 2015]. 
[31]  PHP Framework Interop Group, "PHP Framework Interop Group," [Online]. 
Available: http://www.php-fig.org/. [Accessed 15 June 2015]. 
[32]  PHP Framework Interop Group, "HTTP Message Interfaces," [Online]. 
Available: http://www.php-fig.org/psr/psr-7/. [Accessed 15 June 2015]. 
[33]  Igor Wiedler, "Stack," [Online]. Available: http://stackphp.com/. [Accessed 18 
June 2015]. 
[34]  The League of Extraordinary Packages, "Route," [Online]. Available: 
http://route.thephpleague.com/. [Accessed 18 June 2015]. 
[35]  A. Ferrara, "N-Tier Architecture - An Introduction," [Online]. Available: 
http://blog.ircmaxell.com/2012/08/n-tier-architecture-introduction.html. 
[Accessed 18 June 2015]. 
[36]  The League of Extraordinary Packages, [Online]. Available: 
http://event.thephpleague.com/2.0/. [Accessed 18 June 2015]. 
[37]  Sensio Labs, "The EventDispatcher Component," [Online]. Available: 
http://symfony.com/doc/current/components/event_dispatcher/introduction.html. 
[Accessed 18 June 2015]. 
[38]  Sabre, "Sabre EventEmitter," [Online]. Available: 
http://sabre.io/event/eventemitter/. [Accessed 18 June 2015]. 
[39]  J. Boggiano, "Github Monolog," Github, [Online]. Available: 
https://github.com/Seldaek/monolog. [Accessed 18 June 2015]. 
[40]  The PHP Group, "Mcrypt," [Online]. Available: 
http://php.net/manual/en/book.mcrypt.php. [Accessed 15 June 2015]. 
[41]  J. Daemen and V. Rijmen, "AES Proposal: Rijndael," National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, [Online]. Available: 
 69 
 
http://csrc.nist.gov/archive/aes/rijndael/Rijndael-ammended.pdf. [Accessed 15 
June 2015]. 
[42]  "Announcing the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)," National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, [Online]. Available: 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf. [Accessed 15 June 
2015]. 
[43]  B. Schneier, "Description of a New Variable-Length Key, 64-bit Block Cipher 
(Blowfish)," [Online]. Available: https://www.schneier.com/paper-blowfish-
fse.html. [Accessed 15 June 2015]. 
[44]  W. Penard and T. van Werkhoven, "On the Secure Hash Algorithm Family," 
Utrecht University, [Online]. Available: 
http://www.staff.science.uu.nl/~werkh108/docs/study/Y5_07_08/infocry/project/
Cryp08.pdf. [Accessed 15 June 2015]. 
[45]  H. Moody, "Respect Validation," Respect, [Online]. Available: 
http://respect.li/Validation/. [Accessed 18 June 2015]. 
[46]  C. Cornutt, "Effective Validation with Respect," websec.io, [Online]. Available: 
http://websec.io/2013/04/01/Effective-Validation-with-Respect.html. [Accessed 
15 June 2015]. 
[47]  SensioLabs, "Twig," [Online]. Available: http://twig.sensiolabs.org/. [Accessed 
15 June 2015]. 
[48]  T. Otwell, "Github Illuminate View," [Online]. Available: 
https://github.com/illuminate/view. [Accessed 15 June 2015]. 
[49]  J. Reinink, "Plates Native PHP Templates," The PHP League, [Online]. 
Available: http://platesphp.com/. [Accessed 15 June 2015]. 
[50]  Open Web Application Security Project, "OWASP Zed Attack Proxy," [Online]. 
Available: 
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Zed_Attack_Proxy_Project. 
[Accessed 18 June 2015]. 
[51]  "SQLMap," [Online]. Available: http://sqlmap.org/. [Accessed 18 June 2015]. 
 
